Switching behavior of finnish farmers : key elements of commitment and loyalty by Morfi, Chrysa
  
 
 
Switching Behavior of Finnish Farmers 
Key Elements of Commitment and Loyalty 
 
Chrysa Morfi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Master’s thesis  ·  30 hec  ·  Advanced level  
Environmental Economics and Management – Master’s Programme 
Degree thesis No 831  ·  ISSN 1401-4084 
Uppsala 2014 
iiii 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title Switching Behavior of Finnish Farmers 
 
Chrysa Morfi 
 
 
Supervisors: Konstantinos Karantininis, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 
 Department of Economics 
 
 Feng Li, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 
 Department of Economics 
 
Examiner: Ing-Marie Gren, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 
 Department of Economics 
 
 
Credits: 30 hec 
Level: A2E  
Course title: Degree Project in Economics 
Course code: EX0537 
Programme/Education: Environmental Economics and Management, Master’s 
Programme 
Faculty: Faculty of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences 
 
Place of publication: Uppsala 
Year of publication: 2014 
Name of Series: Degree project/SLU, Department of Economics 
No: 831 
ISSN 1401-4084 
Online publication: http://stud.epsilon.slu.se 
 
Key words: Agricultural cooperatives, commitment, loyalty, switching behavior
 
iiii 
 Acknowledgements  
 
I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my supervisors Professor Konstantinos 
Karantininis and postdoctoral researcher Feng Li whose constant support, guidance, advices, 
patience and trust not only were invaluable but furthermore created an excellent environment 
during the last 6 months.  Pr.Karantininis is without a doubt one of the greatest professors a 
student can encounter and it was a great honor to work under his guidance. Feng Li is the 
kinder and more patient supervisor I could imagine. Unquestionably, a student cannot ask for 
greater supervisors than those two.  
 
I received generous support from Professor Yves Surry who was always willing to answer my 
questions, make recommendations and provide me with technical support. For all these, I owe 
my deepest gratitude to Pr. Yves. 
 
I would also like to offer my special thanks to professors Jerker Nilsson and Petri Ollila for 
their kindness to provide me the data used in the thesis which without it, this project would 
have not been possible.  
 
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Theodoros and Ioanna Morfi, and my brother 
Emmanouil for their love and support all these years.  
 
Uppsala, December 2013 
Chrysa Morfi 
iii 
 
 Abstract 
 
The globalization and industrialization trends in agricultural sector changed the scene of the 
cooperative institutions. The notion of “traditional” cooperative appears to be outmoded; within 
the Finnish agricultural model, a cooperative is a multinational organization open to stock 
exchange markets yet still controlled by the members. A key factor determining the successful 
operation of the organization is membership. As the data indicate, the majority of the farmers 
decide to remain royal to the organization hence they never switch to an Investor Owned Firm 
(IOF). Is there any profound reasoning for this behavior?  Does cooperative ideology still holds 
an important impact, when it comes to selection of a cooperative or an IOF partner? How 
farmers assess the information they received from their cooperatives? Farmers who raise their 
voices are indeed more loyal? Using a zero inflated Poisson model on data retrieved from a 
sample of Finnish farmers, this project attempts to clarify “soft” factors that influence the 
decision of farmers to join and remain royal to a cooperative.  Farmers, who will use the 
organization to advance their own interest, will not mind to switch if they get the same benefits 
or complain to the cooperative is less likely to be part of the group of farmers that never 
switched to an IOF.  At the same time, previous good experiences, making proposal to the 
organization and the process of ageing appears to reduce the switching behavior among  
the “switchers.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
To understand the reasons and the very core of the establishment of the cooperative 
organization, a travel back in time is required. During the 19th century, the income derived 
from agricultural activities provided so little support which made even basic goods inaccessible 
to rural population.  Motivated by the unpropitious conditions, a group of weavers formed a 
primal model for a consumer cooperative and set the base for cooperatives principals, values 
and ethical code. Cooperatives worldwide are autonomous and independent organizations open 
to anyone willing to indulge in membership, are controlled democratically and financed by the 
members, Agricultural cooperatives assist farmers and help maximize their income, often by 
providing various services otherwise unattainable to them. Large scale facilities such as 
petroleum refineries, is an example of such services. In other cases, cooperatives act as 
"negotiators"; by gathering production of small scale farmers, cooperatives achieve better deals 
and prices for the members. Additionally, it is not unusual for farmers to rely on technical 
advice from the organization to improve their activities, especially considering that one primary 
cooperative objective is educating and training the members. All in one cooperatives are 
organizations initially establish to improve the quality of life for the members, and nowadays, 
aim to advance their operations in any feasible way. 
 
Cooperative organizations dominate the agribusiness scene in many countries and are 
particularly important in Scandinavia. They are present in almost every level of the agri-food 
and fiber value chain. For the academic organizational economist the cooperative form still 
constitutes a puzzle. Despite the kind intentions and cooperatives' objectives, there are various 
complications that result from common ownership of the capital. As cooperatives grow older 
and larger, literature concerning problems and inefficiencies of their operation is gaining 
attention, contributing with observations or even proposals for particularly issues. In large and 
complex organizations, the board of directors and management encounter problems deriving 
from vaguely defined property rights. When portfolio issues appear, members lacking the 
ability to discern between the long term benefits of the efficient operations of the cooperative 
and their temporary personal benefits, try to alter the portfolio of the organization at the 
expense of the organization. Additionally, the board of directors and management of the 
cooperative, holding physical assets and capital, take advantages of economies of scale and 
scope, aiming to increase the growth of the cooperative. This distribution of additional earnings 
can alter the way members view the cooperative institution and alienate them from their patron 
role. Furthermore, larger cooperatives are facing increased agency costs, an issue described in 
literature as control problem, due to lack of information between the management of the 
cooperative and the members. 
 
Those issues have been present in the research of cooperative organization for more than 30 
years, however the globalization and industrialization trends in the agricultural sector changed 
the scene of the cooperative institutions. New hybrid cooperatives are forming allowing 
transferability of equity shares. Cooperatives are often multinational organizations with the 
base membership expanded in different countries. However, despite the large scale activities, 
social capital is always a determinant factor for the successful operation of the organization; 
this is important because when a cooperative is losing its social capital, financial capital is at 
stake. An important aspect of cooperative social capital is the commitment of its members. It is 
a common phenomenon that cooperative members seek for alternatives and patronize other 
firms when they find better conditions. What drives their choice? Does ideology play any role 
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 in farmer’s choice to patronize an investor owned firm (IOF) instead of their own cooperative? 
How do farmers assess the information provided by the cooperative? How does the degree of 
involvement with the organization influence members' behavior? The aspiration of this project 
is a contribution to the research related with those "soft" factors influencing members’ loyalty. 
The project focuses on the Finnish cooperatives. 
 
The Finnish cooperative scene represents an intriguing hybrid cooperative model; it combines 
the objective of cooperative organizations yet benefits from external funding. Two distinct 
classes of shares were introduced allowing members to control the organization while the 
cooperative is open to the stock exchange market. Another notable feature is the multinational 
operation of the Finnish cooperatives In consequence of those special characteristics of Finnish 
cooperatives and with the use of primary data gathered through an email survey from a 
representative sample of Finnish farmers, a number of hypotheses were formed, to explore 
farmer's switching behavior. Particularly, farmers who display one or more of the 
characteristics such as: readiness to switch to an IOF if the get the same advantages, use 
cooperative as a means to advance own benefits or view of cooperative strictly as a business 
relation, are expected to be less loyal. Similarly, farmers who embrace cooperative ideology, 
value past experience from long term cooperation, perceive cooperative as shelter towards large 
scale production, trust the information provided by the organization, are active participants in 
the organization, and assess that their proposal have an impact on the organization, are expected 
to be more loyal. 
 
Loyalty like every multidimensional ideal is infeasible to be captured in a direct manner, 
therefore the number of switches between a cooperative and an IOF is used as a proxy for 
loyalty; the more times a farmer is switching the less loyal we assume he is. A special 
characteristic of the dataset is that the vast majority of the farmers in the sample have never 
switched to an IOF. This leads us to choose as appropriate econometric one that can handle data 
with many zeros (non-switching, in our case). Thus the assumption made is the existence of 
regime splitting mechanism distinguishing between two groups; the "never switching" farmers 
and those who have switched more than once and up to 7 times during the last 3 years. The best 
model for such samples is the robust zero-inflated Poisson model. This consists of two separate, 
but simultaneous regressions. The logit part of the model estimates the underlying factors 
determining the pseudo-log odds of being in the "never switching" regime, hence stay loyal to 
the cooperative organization. The Poisson regression estimates the factors that affect the 
likelihood of the number of switches. The results of the logit regression show that farmers who 
exercise “voice” to their organization in the form of complaints or propositions, who have no 
problem to switch buyer if they get the some advantages or those who are willing to use the 
cooperative power in order to promote their own interests, have lower odds of being in the 
never switching group of farmers. At the same time for farmers that do switch from 
cooperatives to IOFs the results suggest that the complaining or proposing to cooperatives, the 
appreciation of previous experiences from the organization and the process of ageing decrease 
the switching behavior while farmers whose recommendations have an impact on the 
organization are prone to switch more. 
 
The paper is organized as it follows: in section 2 background information is provided aiming to 
inform about the origin of the cooperative as a movement, the objectives and principals. 
Additionally, a review on the most common problems that cooperatives face, intents to 
introduce the reader to cooperatives' practices, inefficiencies and challenges. The introductory 
section, closes with some additional information on the characteristics of the Finnish 
Cooperative Model .Section 3 includes literature review on a selection of researches about 
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 cooperative loyalty and generally factors that influence member's satisfaction. The 
establishment of the theoretical framework is reported in section 4 while section 5 provides 
information about the data used in the project. Section 6 discus the methodological approach 
and displays tables of descriptive statistics. The results of the model and discussion of the 
purpose of the project are presented in sections 7 and 8 respectively. Final conclusions and 
recommendations are reported in section 9 and in section 10 the reader can find suggestions for 
further research in the same field. Finally, in Section 11 is given the list of references used for 
the completion of the project.  
1. Background Information 
1.1. Definition, values and history of cooperatives 
The recorded history of cooperatives began in Scotland. In 1769 the Fenwick Weavers society 
formed a consumer cooperative aiming to increase the standards in weaving craft. However it 
was at 1844 in North England when the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers introduced 
equity dividends and established the prototype for modern cooperatives as we know them 
today. A group of weavers facing adverse economic conditions decided to pool their resources 
and work together. By forming an early consumer cooperative, they succeeded to lower the 
price of basic goods which previously were not accessible to them. As initiators of the 
Rochalde principles, they defined the set of values in which cooperatives all around the world 
base their operations. The original principles, as adopted by International Cooperative Alliance 
(ICA) in 1937, include the following: open membership, one member equals one vote, cash 
trading, membership education, political and religious neutrality, no unusual risk assumption, 
limitation on the number of shares owned, limited interest on stock, goods sold at regular retail 
prices and net margins distributed according to patronage. The latest version of principles, as 
being revised by ICA, describes the ideals of the cooperative organization as follows: 
 
• Voluntary and Open Membership 
All people willing to embrace the membership responsibilities are free to use services 
that the cooperative offers without racial, religion, gender, political or any other form of 
discrimination. 
 
• Democratic Member Control 
Members are controlling the organization by forming policies and participating in policy 
making decisions. Members have equal voting rights regardless of the size of their 
operations (one member one vote) and the elective representatives are accountable to the 
members.  
 
• Member Economic Participation "Members contribute equitably to, and 
democratically control, the capital of their cooperative” (Co-operative identity, values 
and principles). Part of this capital consists of common property for the members; 
however, in some cases members receive some sort of compensation for their capital 
contribution by the advantages rendered from their membership. The underlying reasons 
for the members to contribute with capital are; further development of the cooperative, 
benefits that are deriving from the collaboration with the cooperative and which are 
analogous to the extent of the transactions made with the organization and various other 
activities. 
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 • Autonomy and Independence 
Cooperatives are autonomous and self-organized organizations. In case of collaboration 
with other organizations such as government or external funding from Inventor Owned 
Firms, the cooperative ensures the organization's autonomy: control activities will 
continue being imposed by members. 
 
• Education, Training and Information 
Cooperatives, in order to create an efficient organization, educate their members, 
representatives, managers and employees. Also they bear the task of informing the 
public about the values, ethics code and advantages that result when people deal with 
cooperatives.  
 
• Co-operation among Co-operatives 
In order to strengthen their position, cooperatives are collaborating with each other in 
local, national and international level. 
 
• Concern for Communities 
Cooperatives are integrated into a framework aiming to  promote sustainable 
development policies. 
 
 
Considering the vast variation of cooperatives organizational structures, the absence of a 
universally recognized definition for cooperatives is a natural resultant. The International 
Cooperative Alliance states: "A co-operative is an autonomous association of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through 
a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise" (Co-operative identity, values and 
principles). 
  
 The United States Department of Agriculture (Frederick, 1997) emphasizes 3 principles – 
criteria for an organization to be identified as a cooperative 
 
• The User-Benefit Principle 
There is a nexus of different services and advantages, a member collaborating with a 
cooperative can benefit from. Services that are not offered by private sector or the 
assurance of quality supply delivered on time, are some of those. The benefits the 
members obtain are analogous to the size of usage of the available services. 
Furthermore, with the efficient operation of the cooperative, the "added value" of the 
products generated by co-ops services ensures additional profits for the members. Those 
earnings are distributed to the members. In contrary, if the cooperative didn't exist those 
earnings would be achieved by middlemen or processors.  
 
• The User-Owner Principle 
Members are owners of the cooperative. They shoulder the responsibility of financing 
the organization: a necessary condition to obtain and maintain competitiveness.  
 
• The User-Control Principle}  
Cooperative members are responsible for exercising control either directly by voting at 
annual assembly and other meetings or through their elected representatives. In many 
cases one member is entitled to one vote; however in some cases members receive some 
additional votes in relation to their patronage volume. Those additional votes are limited 
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 so the democratic control principle is not trampled. Only the members are allowed to 
participate in the democratic procedures of the cooperative hence the purpose of the 
existence and the objectives of the cooperative are protected against the interest of 
external funders or other institutions.  
 
The U.S. department of Agriculture lists three core functions of the cooperatives providing a 
framework to answer the question why farmers choose to form and patronize one.  
 
• Marketing activities help farmers to maximize earnings deriving from selling what they 
produce. Specifically bargaining associations help members negotiate price and term of 
sales with possible buyers. Other cooperatives gather production of different farmers 
into large quantities before they sell it. In this way, small scale farmers who lack the 
means to deliver the product to the market or the volume of their production is too small 
to achieve favorable prices in negotiation, are assisted and protected by the cooperative. 
Some cooperatives by processing member's product add further value to the original 
product.  
 
• Purchasing activities are in agricultural sectors one of the reasons justifying the 
existence of cooperatives. Farmers are able to purchase necessary quality supplies in 
affordable prices hence the cost of their operation is reduced. Additionally they  access  
large scale facilities that would have been impossible to obtain on individual base. 
(example: petroleum refineries and phosphate, potash, and nitrogen manufacturing 
plants) 
• Services in various activities are carried out by the organization, directly or indirectly 
linked to farm issues, for example technical advices and non-farming services. In 
relation to nonagricultural issues, credit unions are formed to provide loans to farmers 
with more lenient terms compared to those of banks and other private institutions.  
 
Undoubtedly, one of the reasons explaining why cooperative organization established initially 
was the correction of market failures and providence of what is called yardstick of 
competition": Activities that were too expensive to be carried out by private own firms were 
achieved through cooperatives.   
 
2.2. What problems cooperatives are facing 
For decades researchers are trying to identify which particular problems cooperatives are facing 
and where these problems derive from. Neoclassical theory, along with property rights, agency, 
life circle and transaction costs theories are some of the approaches used to explain 
cooperatives' inefficiencies. However the underlying causes in these different approaches are 
the same. This section aims to introduce the reader to the following core problems that occur 
under the cooperative regime:  
 
• Common ownership problem 
• Horizon problem 
• Portfolio problem  
• Control problem 
• Influence cost problem  
 
To examine why traditional cooperatives are not the dominant organization form despite the 
vast increase of cooperatives market share in the last decades, (Cook, 1995) establishes the 
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 "five stage life circle of a cooperative" theory. At stage one the motivating forces behind the 
genesis of cooperative "waves" are either the existence of excess supply induced prices and the 
need to balance this inefficiency, or the necessity to overcome market failures including the 
establishment of a competitive yardstick.  At stage two cooperatives which were created in 
order to countervail market failures, offer more favourable prices compared to IOF´s, which 
means benefits outweigh the costs therefore those organizations will enter stage three. At the 
next level, cooperatives operation has already triggered IOF´s behaviour resulting in small 
differentiation in prices between IOF´s and co-ops. Vaguely defined properties rights pose 
hurdlers on the residual claimant generated by assets. Specifically, the existence of the 
cooperative is threatened by following issues: free rider problem describes the situation that 
occurs when a non-member captures the benefits of the cooperative, in terms of trade and 
negotiations, without patronizing it. The horizon problem describes the case where residual 
claimants of an asset last longer than the productive life of the asset itself. The portfolio 
problem emerges when members adopt strategies to alter the portfolio of the organization 
aiming to reduce their personal risk at the expenses of lower returns for the cooperative. It is 
worth mentioning this behaviour steams from the lack of mechanisms to support transferability 
of residual claims resulting in the investment and the patronage decision for a member to 
coincide. The Control problem refers to the inefficiencies and the lack of information between 
members of a cooperative with management of the cooperative and the board of directors, 
causing increased agency costs. Lastly, the influence cost problem arises when management 
decisions alter the wealth of distribution among the members. In the fourth stage of the life 
circle, the cooperative managers become aware of the pre mentioned issues therefore begin the 
formation of strategies such as exit the market, continue or transition. At the last stage 
cooperative can either chose between altering to an IOF or liquidate assets if exits choice 
prevails. If cooperative's managers decide to "continue", searching for outside equity or the 
formation of a strategy that will allow the cooperative to obtain internal capital is a necessity. 
Another alternative is the formation of a hybrid cooperative type known as new-generation 
cooperative, where different policies stressing mitigation of property rights issues are applied.  
 
Fulton (1995) with a focus on technological change and society's values examines the future of 
cooperatives in an environment where individualism arises and the separation between 
ownership and usership is an increasing demand.  As it is stated in this article "the greater is a 
party's ability to affect the return an asset can generate, the greater will be the share of the re-
sidual that that party will assume”(p.1146). In case of the cooperatives, members are the ones 
who can claim residual generated by the cooperative and given than agricultural cooperatives 
were closely related with unpredictable variability, the establishment of cooperative could 
eliminate free riding and other types of individualistic behaviors. However, the technological 
advantages on agricultural sector have diminished this unpredictably variability up to the point 
that the need for institution structures such as the one of a cooperative organization is declined.  
Regarding the changes in the society's values there is evidence of increasing individualism. The 
same article mentions that commitment to a cooperative is largely related with economics 
attributes rather than social. Additionally, conversion of cooperatives into IOF´s and the 
practice of IOF´s funding techniques are indicators of members perception about the traditional 
usership –ownership framework. As individualism increases farmers prefer to receive benefits 
as investors than cooperatives members and this behaviour could threaten the existence of the 
organization.  
 
Vitaliano (1983) addresses control problem using agency theoretical framework. The 
management and the board of directors consist of people who are not residual claimants. 
Subsequently the decision making team, regardless of the form of the organization, will tend to 
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 be in favour of policies that will decrease the value of residual claims. Given the lack of 
marketability of residual claimant, members will use the redemption option when management 
implements such policies in order to excess control. The result is managers to lose control over 
assets. Conclusively, the absence of immediate redeemability and marketability when it comes 
to residual claims results in less control in making decisions, therefore the board of directors 
has the responsibility to secure exercising effective control over the decisions. Additionally, as 
Vitaliano states: “The residual claims of a cooperative organization are acquired or 
relinquished as a concomitant of the decision to enter into or terminate a contractual 
arrangement to supply patronage and capital to a cooperative organization and are therefore 
contingent property rights, which raises several problems”(1983, p.1081). The common 
property problem occurs because new members basically have the same rights over residual 
claimants, depending on their patron, as older members. As it could be expected, members 
depending on the duration of the membership in the cooperative, create subgroups intending to 
favour those decisions that attract more organization cash flow to their group. Once again, the 
horizon problem arises when farmers depending on their own individual preferences to 
continue working, form subgroups with the tendency to support policies with shorten 
investment decisions pay-off horizons. 
 
Nilsson (2001) argues that under specific circumstances, problems deriving from vaguely 
defined properties rights are eliminated either by a new structure of organization in 
cooperatives, the new generation co-ops, or simpler when the correction of market failures 
outweighs monitoring issues. Most of the problems cooperatives are facing are deriving from 
the lack of tradability of the residuals claims. New generation co-ops are a hybrid form of 
organization that allows transferability of equity shares and additionally, ownership requires a 
level of business involvement with the cooperative. Although unallocated capital continues to 
exist, property rights in form of shares can be trade at the market. Furthermore according to 
Nilsson, there are successful and competitive cooperatives which despite the existence of 
unallocated capital, operate efficiently. Nilsson argues that the driving force is members' 
perception of cooperative's operation and their individual situation arising from it. Satisfied 
members are willing to bear the cost associated with the residual claims. He states:”No specific 
co-operative problem exist if members do have individual property to the co-operative firm or if 
the co-operative is collectively financed and organized while at the same time there is high 
commitment and strong social integration within the membership"(p.15) 
 
In the same article, Nilsson assorts cooperatives into four types: traditional cooperatives, 
entrepreneurial co-operatives, Degenerated co-operatives and ex-co-operatives. Traditional 
cooperatives, consisting of satisfied members willing to embrace both their patron and investor 
role, will not face considerable property rights problem. Furthermore the cooperative is 
successful at correcting market failures. The second cooperative type also faces limited 
property rights issues while restoring market's function because of the ability to trade residual 
claims. Concerning the degenerated cooperatives members', dissatisfaction with the operation 
of the organization occurs. The organization fails to restore market inefficiencies and members 
are reluctant to invest in their cooperative. Property rights and monitoring issues are threatening 
the existence of the cooperative. Finally, the last type is composed by organizations which their 
structure is closer to IOFs, particularly are former degenerated cooperatives converted to IOF. 
They do not face significant problems with residual claims and they have no interest in 
correcting market inefficiencies. 
 
To address the question "Why cooperatives turn to IOFs" Fulton and Hueth, (2009) examine 13 
case studies of cooperatives conversions, failures and restructuring. They argue that the 
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 structure chosen by cooperatives and their members is influenced by structural problems such 
as lack of capital, vaguely defined property rights and portfolio problems. One apparent 
explanation of cooperatives conversion is situated at market's environment involvement. 
Changes in technology, consumer preferences, institutional framework, regional-national-
international policies take place and as the authors are stating: “If the underlying problem with 
the investor ownership is, to some extent remedied by these changes, a cooperative operating in 
this market may lose its relevance"(p.9). Additionally, the management of a cooperative which 
holds physical assets and operating capital will try to increase cooperative's growth by taking 
advantages of economies of scale and scope. A proactive and offensive approach in strategies 
combined with some luck, could present significant firm value. However, the distribution of 
earnings among members could hold an impact on cooperative's character. If farmers are 
seeking and expecting earnings in the future, cooperative will lose the focus in patron value. 
Another argument derives from agricultural industrialization. Increased capital requirements are 
posing difficulties for cooperatives to operate "much beyond the farm gate" which basically 
implies that it is becoming more and more difficult for cooperatives to provide the "yardstick of 
competition" 
 
Commitment in the cooperative is a key factor determining the successful and efficient 
operation of the cooperative. Given their democratic structural form, along with the main 
purpose of their creation, cooperatives have an important asset: member's loyalty. Being a 
member of a cooperative is a decision based not only upon strictly economic criteria but also 
upon ideological beliefs and aspects.  The exploration of determinants of this particular social 
capital is a necessity. Additionally, the industrialization and globalization that took place in the 
last decades introduced tremendous changes, not only in agricultural sector and industries but 
also in farmer's perception and attitudes towards cooperatives. Trying to understand and 
evaluate new requirements and standards held by farmers is quite an intriguing process. This 
project attempts to capture factors that influence farmers' loyalty. Specifically, the core of the 
project is the switching behaviour of farmers; given how often then switch between 
cooperatives and IOF, what are the main motives behind those switches.    
 
2.3. Finnish Cooperative Model and Industry 
Skurnik and Egerstrom, (2007) present the history of Finnish economic model and particularly 
the role of cooperatives in the transformation of Finnish economy. A combination of different 
factors such as the collapse of Soviet Union, the integration to European Union and the 
hazardous economic policies implemented around 1980’s, contribute to a vast change of the 
economic climate. Apart from the collapse of Finland’s major trading partner, Soviet Union, the 
country was also undergoing liberalization processes, moving from Coordinated Market 
Economy (CME) towards a less regulated and protected one. Cooperatives adapted to the new 
conditions and helped the national economy reshape, forming what is called the ”bipolar 
economic system”.  Finnish society turned to the cooperative institution with almost 2900 
organization established. Today practically every Finn is a member to a cooperative. It is worth 
mentioning, unlike most cooperative institutions, the Finnish cooperative movement was 
triggered “from the top – to the ground”. Intellectual personalities of the time, such as Hannes 
Gebhard the father of Finnish cooperatives, promoted the need of cooperative organizations, 
proving that in fact the direction of establishment origin does not matter. 
 
Bekkum and Bijman, (2006) define the Finnish cooperative structure as a hybrid form: 
"cooperatives that have somehow sought to combine their cooperative objectives with the 
benefits of access to external capital"(p.9). They notice how three major agricultural 
cooperatives introduce their subsidiaries cooperatives to the stock market yet manage to retain 
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 their control. To Achieve that a separate class of shares was created exclusively for the 
members. Those shares hold higher voting rights allowing the cooperation's members, even in 
the cases which are the minority of shareholders, to retain organization control.  The authors are 
providing three examples of such cooperatives: 
 
• A forest cooperative, Metsäliitto owns 38 %   its subsidiary M-Real shares, and 60% of 
the voting power.  
• LSO Cooperative similarly poses the minority of HK Ruokatalo shares (37%  ) and  
• The founding cooperatives of Atria Group maintain 58% of its shares and 92% of the 
voting power. 
 
Although the figures have changed, the concept of Finnish hybrid cooperative model remains 
the same: a separate class of shares allows external funding while ensures members control of 
the cooperative. Most of Finnish cooperatives operate both nationwide and abroad. Agricultural 
products bought in host countries are both being proceeded and exported. Subsequently the size 
of Finnish cooperatives is notable larger than Finnish agriculture (Li et al., 2011). The 
following table provides information regarding four of largest agricultural cooperatives in 
Finland.   
 
Table 1: Summary of the largest Finnish agricultural cooperatives 
Processing firm Valio HK Scan Atria Metsäliitto 
Organizational 
form 
Limited liability 
firm 
Limited liability 
firm 
Limited liability 
firm 
Limited liability 
firm 
No. of 
cooperative 
societies, owning 
the processing 
firm 
18 regional and 
local cooperative 
societies, with 
ownership in 
proportion to 
delivery volumes 
LSO (Finland) 
with 69 per cent 
of the votes, and 
Sveriges 
Djurbönder 
(Sweden) with 12 
per cent of votes 
Lihakunta, Itikka 
and Österbottens 
kött, with 
ownership in 
proportion to 
delivery volumes 
One cooperative 
society with 
128,000 forest 
owners 
External owners None  Helsinki Stock 
Exchange  
Helsinki Stock 
Exchange 
Helsinki Stock 
Exchange 
Share of the 
market for 
agricultural 
products, % 
98 51 30 40 
Turnover, 
millions of € 
1,800 2,114 1,300  5,400  
Foreign 
operations 
Extensive exports 
to neighboring 
countries. 
Worldwide sales 
of dairy 
technology 
licenses 
Nine countries, 
mainly in the 
Baltic Sea region. 
Production in the 
neighboring 
countries on the 
basis of animals 
acquired in these 
countries 
Extensive exports 
to the Baltic Sea 
region. 
Production in the 
neighboring 
countries on the 
basis of animals 
acquired in these 
countries 
30 countries 
worldwide 
Source: Feng Li et all (2011) 
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 2. Commitment in Previous Research 
 
Committed members will favor their cooperative even if the alternative choice, Investor Owned 
Firms, could provide them better quality services and prices (Fulton, 1999) This fact self-
documents the necessity of committed member for the long term surviving of the organization. 
In other words, the loyalty of members is essential for the successful operation of the 
cooperative organization (Bhuyan and Leistritz, 2001; Hakelius, 1996). There is evidence 
supporting the connection between reduction in member’s commitment and weak market and 
financial performance of a cooperative (Lang and Fulton, 2004). But what are the constituent 
elements of a satisfied and committed member? When trying to identify factors that strengthen 
commitment within the cooperative framework, the notion of trust appears to be dominant in 
the literature. Commitment is built on trust and trust is built upon features of the management 
of the cooperative such as reliability, ability to avoid wrong decisions, ability to stay connected 
with the members and being concern about their interests (Barraud-Didier et al., 2012). 
Producers assess their more frequent economic actors as more trustworthy compared to those 
that are trading less often (Kollock, 1994). Managerial competence found to influence trust 
among “internal stakeholders” of an organization, i.e. cooperative members (Pirson and 
Malhotra, 2010). Additionally, members who trust the board of directors and the management 
tent to support organizational changes that could be vital for the effective operation of the 
cooperative. According to Bromiley and Cummings, (1995) if all the other factors are held 
constant, trust affect performance of the organization. With respect to transaction costs, the 
management of an organization can reduce costs that derive from monitoring procedures when 
the organization is trading with people who are considered to be trustworthy. Recent empirical 
evidence supports the hypothesis of reduced transaction costs and lower potential risks deriving 
from uncertainty, as a consequence of the establishment of trust within an organization (Xiao et 
al., 2010). Additionally, trading costs can also be reduced when cooperating with trustworthy 
partners, which axiomatically results in enhanced profitability for the organization. 
 
Is the profitable operation of a cooperative adequate condition to promote member’s trust 
towards the management of the cooperative? Empirical evidence suggests that is not. Österberg 
and Nilsson (2009) look into the way members' perceptions and assessment regarding 
cooperatives' operation can influence members’ trust to the management and the general 
commitment to the organization .They found that although satisfied members with the 
profitability of their farm operations, tent to be more committed, they have less trust in the 
board of directors. In addition, Hernandez-Espallardo et al., (2009) research seems to verify 
Österberg and Nilsson findings; important factor determining members satisfaction and desire 
to continue patronage their cooperatives is the ability to have access to information that would 
allow them to evaluate the performance of their cooperative. Additionally, the sense of 
safeguard, either in the context of trust or enforced by legal means, effect members satisfaction 
since members are feeling less exposed against potential expropriation technics implemented by 
the management of the cooperative. So why is that profitability and price satisfaction although 
important, are not sufficient conditions to establish trust between cooperative’s members and 
management? When cooperatives proceed to horizontal and vertical integration, farmers are 
becoming less involved and eventually lose of their trust towards the management of the 
cooperative (Nilsson et al., 2012). However, it is important to point out that the prices and 
profitability may not necessarily induce trust but still contribute significantly towards the 
decision to continue patronage a cooperative(Mensah et al., 2012).  
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 Cechin et al.,(2013) discern commitment into two distinguish components; members’ 
commitment to consumer oriented strategies and members’ commitment to collective action. 
While the first type of commitment refers to member’s economic rationality the second one is 
associated with traditional values such as altruism and ideology. Their research revealed and 
interesting case. Market mechanisms as expected strengthen member’s commitment to 
consumer oriented strategies, but is also positive related with member’s commitment to 
collective action. Contradictory as it might appears Hakelius et al.(2013) provide example of 
such cases. Specifically, members of cooperatives where dissatisfied because of the 
organization’s inability to offer better prices for their differentiated products. They took action, 
exit the cooperative and formed a new cooperative. Both researches indicate that market 
mechanisms if not strengthen cooperative commitment, are at least factors that do not pose any 
threat towards it. For a group of farmers to demonstration such behavior there are several 
characteristics required such as strong entrepreneurial, technical and administrational skills. 
Nevertheless, the research evidence member’s desire for greater participation, involvement and 
control in the organization. In a prior research it was noted than even committed members feel 
there is inability of management to include members in the decision making procedures 
(Dakurah et al., 2005). Another method to identify the elements of cooperative commitment is 
to explore the reasons a farmer decides to join the organization. At the end, satisfaction is 
closely related with members initial “goals” and to what extent these goals are achieved 
(Dakurah et al., 2005). Pascucci et al. (2012) found that public innervation, in the context of 
supporting extension services or reduced tax obligations; can increase the probability of a 
farmer to use a cooperative organization. This indicates the importance of the “competitive 
yardstick function” of the organization. Klein et al. (1997) also suggest that farmers’ 
assessment of cooperative value added activities tent to increase patronage in the organization.  
 
Bijman and Verhees, (2011) in order to identify key elements of commitment, they distinguish 
between the role of farmer as a costumer and as a member of a cooperative. Their findings 
suggest that costumer commitment in cooperatives and IOFs is positive related with good 
customer relationships, cooperative characteristics and social network. Farmers consider good 
relationships more important than low price or high quality products. Additionally, cooperative 
members are more committed to their organization than other farmers to their IOF supplier. The 
importance of social networks and commitment among cooperative members and IOF’s 
costumers has also been examined by Enander et al., (2010) Particularly, social influences 
found to be more important and stronger among cooperative members compared to IOF’s 
costumers. Regarding the social role of the cooperative, Klein et al.(1997) found that farmers 
who believe that the cooperative does not hold any significant social role, tent to patronize less 
the cooperative while in a more recent survey, (Dakurah et al., 2005) 60 percent of the 
answerers of the questionnaire in the region of Alberta, assess that cooperatives are more 
involved with community services compared to IOFs 
 
Many researchers tried to explore how age influences commitment to the cooperative. 
According to (Staatz, 1983) older farmers, due to shorten investment horizon, are more likely to 
exit sooner compared to younger farmers, hence is expected to be less loyal to their 
cooperatives implying that they tent to switch to IOFs or free ride. On the other hand, farmers 
with low discount rates are expected to be more loyal. Given that young farmers are usually in 
higher debt compared to older farmers, Staatz also suggests that younger farmers tent to be 
more loyal. However there are various researches indicating that older farmers are prone to be 
more loyal(Dakurah et al., 2005; Klein et al., 1997; Westerlund Lind and Åkesson, 2005).   
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 3. Theoretical Framework 
 
While IOFs' primary target is profit maximization, cooperatives' peruse, as it is clearly stated at 
the user-benefits principle, is to provide and distribute benefits to its users. This characteristic 
constitutes the essential distinguishing difference between cooperatives and other business 
forms. Ideology can result in participation to a movement as the result of a search for meaning 
and an expression of its own views (Klandermans, 2008). Therefore it is arguable that 
cooperative's ideology can hold an impact on members' commitment and loyalty. Even though 
in many countries cooperative ideology is not considered to be a sufficient factor for a farmer to 
embrace a cooperative (Karantininis and Zago, 2001), the inculcation of "cooperative ideology" 
could alter members' perception, cost benefits calculations and furthermore reduce conflicts 
derived from differences in preferences and portfolios among members(Staatz, 1987). It is 
worth mentioning that cooperative ideology viewed as socialistic institution used to pose 
hurdles to older generations. Socialism could be identified as relative ideology to Leninism, 
Stalinism and Maoism(Anderson and Henehan, 2005). However, since it's absurd for present 
farmers to feel threaten by the notation of socialism it is safely to hypothesize: 
 
H1: Members who embrace cooperative's ideology are less likely to switch to an IOF. 
 
There is significant evidence suggesting that cooperative members are influenced by traditions. 
Enander et al. (2010) in their research among Swedish forest owners find that many of the 
owners are basically continuing the family business. Part of the tradition values involves the 
choice of business partner, in case of IOF, or patronizing a cooperative. In other words the 
present choice of IOF or Cooperative is highly correlated with previous generation's choices. 
Anderson and Henehan, (2005, p.2) believe that "farmers pass their bad experience with co-
operative down from generation to generation".Kool et al. (1997) find that for purchases 
regarding regular products farmers tent to deal with the same partners without  further search 
for new alternatives. Additionally, when it comes to acquiring new equipment, they simplify 
the process on the ground of "learning over time" attitude. Kool, (1994) also considers the 
presence of a "habit" as one possible explanation of why farmers choose the same suppliers: It 
appears to be convenient for them not to change suppliers. In some cases, one of the main 
intensives for customers of IOFs or members of cooperatives, to continue their business with 
their partner, is the role of the organization's representative as an advisor (Enander et al., 2010; 
Kool, 1994). Especially in the case of forest owners, IOFs suppliers seek advices from IOFs 
representatives implying that they seem not to realize the opposite interests between them and 
the IOF’s representatives. Previous experiences are one considerable determinant factor on a 
member's decision to continue patronage a cooperative or not.  Regardless of what lies behind 
those experiences, tradition, trust or just a habit, could hold an impact on members' loyalty:  
 
H2: Member who value previous experiences with cooperatives are less likely to switch to an 
IOF. 
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 An individual could participate in a movement in order to influence the social and political 
environment. This behavior is described with the term instrumentality (Klandermans, 2008). 
Mutatis mutandis a farmer could join a cooperative in order to change the economic conditions 
he or she is facing. Considering the user-control principle, which states that users of a 
cooperative are responsible to exercise control, it comes as no surprise the findings of Österberg 
and Nilsson, (2009). Specifically they found that democratic control is crucial for members 
meaning that "members attach strong importance to their participation in the democratic 
governance”(p.194). Furthermore they suggest that members who feel that they hold some 
chances to influence the board of directors' decisions through their democratic control are likely 
to trust and support the board. On a more recent research Cechin et al. (2013) findings verify 
Österber and Nillson's argument over positive correlation between commitment to collective 
action and democratic control of the cooperative. Nevertheless, opposed to this positive 
behavior, as has already been discussed, Cook (1995) describes the portfolio problem as a 
situation emerging when in order to reduce their personal risk, members are trying to alter the 
portfolio of the cooperative, which inevitably results in lower returns for the cooperative. There 
is a distinguishing line between a farmer who values the democratic principles of the 
cooperative and a farmer who will use those as a mean to promote his own agenda.   A member 
motivated to use power to emerge his own benefits despite the overall loss of efficiency his 
actions are causing to the cooperative, can be considered as less committed member: 
 
H3: Members who use the cooperative to power/advance their own interests are more likely to 
switch to an IOF. 
 
Calling in mind the motivating forces behind the development and establishment of the 
cooperative organization form, we encounter a group of workers back in the late 19th century, 
which driven by extreme poverty and adverse living conditions, create a self-organized 
movement. This early attempt of farmers to organize themselves started only after they became 
aware of the economic abuse held by the agricultural sector towards them. The cooperative 
organization was the reaction of private sector's unfair treatment towards farmers: a new 
organization form adopting higher ethics code was a necessity (Lasley and Baumel, 1996). The 
very essence of cooperative organization was the development of a "protection net" for farmers 
against private sector's tactics. Unlike within cooperative regime, IOF’s primary purpose is the 
constant maximization of profits without “social or any other form of considerations” (Robb et 
al., 2010, p.4). In an economic environment characterized by international trade without any 
barriers and major inequality within society, inevitable, we encounter the following question; 
what is the role of cooperative organizations and what challenges need to be faced? 
Specifically, as cooperatives become larger, more complex with international activities, a 
dilemma rises: should the cooperative rely on expensive domestically produced raw material or 
choose cheaper foreign products which will maximize organization profits (Henning, 2009). 
Fulton states: "member's commitment is a sort of glue that allows membership and business 
volume to be maintained even as trade becomes more fluid and barriers to reorganization are 
broken down"(1999, p.418). If a cooperative continues to provide "shelter" to the members, or 
more accurately if members' perceive their cooperative as a shelter, this could arguable be a 
factor that increases commitment.  
 
H4: Members who view cooperative as a shelter are more likely not to switch to an IOF. 
 
The increment in profitability in terms of direct payment and patronage refunds or reduced cost, 
is one of the most crucial factors, determining the degree of satisfaction a farmer is 
experiencing through a cooperative (Westerlund Lind and Åkesson, 2005). Even though 
13 
 
 empirical evidence proving comparative efficiency of IOF's compared to cooperatives does not 
yet exists, there is a literature of theoretical arguments pointing out why a cooperative is less 
efficient. Particularly, cooperatives that succeed in correcting marketing failures and act as a 
"yardstick" of competition at some point trigger IOF's reaction. Short run cost of the 
cooperative inevitably will be notable to the members and conflicts regarding properties rights 
will occur. At the same time IOFs’ prices differ a little if they differ at all (Fulton, 1995). 
Farmers who view a cooperative organization strictly as a business model, regardless of its 
social and cultural role when costs of operating with a cooperative are increased while the 
prices offered by a private firm are more favourable, are expected to switch to an IOF. On the 
ground of these, the fifth hypothesis is formulated as it follows: 
 
H5: Members who view the cooperative as pure business are more likely to switch to an IOF. 
 
Nilsson (2001) emphasizes the significance of values such as solidarity, equality and fairness, 
to advance effective operation and further growth of the cooperative: volume increases along 
with the membership and economies of a scale appear. Participation to a movement could be 
the outcome of a manifestation of identification with a group, a principle known as identity 
(Klandermans, 2008). Unlike commitment to ideology, where an individual can share the goal 
without identifying himself with the group, collective identity is a constant interplay among 
individual identities (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Borgen, (2004, p.390) notes the importance 
farmers perception and appreciation of the collectively own equity capital and particularly, the 
assessment of "unexpected and potentially damaging contingencies that cannot easily be dealt 
with by members individually and separately”. The establishment of a collective identity 
among members of a cooperative not only reduces negative effects deriving from vaguely 
defined property rights but also reinforces the notion of solidarity among members. 
Additionally, empirical evidence suggests the existence of social networks and their impact on 
decision regarding the choice between cooperative and IOFs (Enander et al., 2010). Under these 
circumstances it rational to assume that a farmer who identifies strongly himself with the 
cooperative will develop a stronger sense of commitment. This farmer will refuse to leave the 
cooperative for an investor owned firm if the alternate offers the exact same advantages.  
Therefore the next hypothesis is formulated as it follows:  
 
 
H6: Members who are willing to switch if the get the same advantages from private buyer are 
more likely to switch to an IOF. 
  
One of cooperative principles as described by the International Cooperative Alliance is 
emphasizing the educational character of the cooperative. Education is a direct means to 
increase member's operation efficiency, hence the general efficiency of the organization. 
Undoubtedly it is difficult to measure education, but the information cooperatives are offering 
to members could be used as a proxy. Klein et al., (1997) notice two contrary directions of 
members assessment of the information received from cooperatives with respect to educational 
background. Farmers with higher educational background tend to apprehend the value of 
information therefore patronize a cooperative in order receive the required information. On the 
other hand, less educated farmers are more dependent on the cooperatives with respect to the 
information they receive. Nevertheless, in both cases information remains an important factor 
influencing the decision to join a cooperative or not. Cooperatives management, as the 
organization grows larger and more complex is trying to substitute personal contact, which is 
getting lost, with better information services (Anderson and Henehan, 2005). But to what 
extend do member trust the information received? As Lasley and Baumel, (1996) state ” Trust 
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 is not something that just happens. It is the result of conscious decisions and efforts to improve 
human relationships"(p.1). What increases members' trust on cooperative organization is a 
matter of discussion for many researchers. According to Borgen ( 2001) members who identify 
themselves strongly with the cooperative tend to trust more the management of the cooperative. 
Nillson et al. (2009) suggest that when members trust the board of directors they are more 
positive oriented to organizational reforms.  A farmer with strong cooperative identity and trust 
in the management's tactics and reforms is more likely to be committed to the cooperative. On 
this basis, the seventh hypothesis is:  
 
H7: Members who trust the information they receive are less likely to switch to an IOF. 
 
As Hirschman´s classic exit, voice and loyalty thesis (1970) describes, when there is a declining 
in the quality of a product or a service an organization, or a firm is providing, there are two 
alternative ways for the management to be informed: Members leave the organization, 
behaviour known as exit or members express their dissatisfaction by addressing to the 
management of the organization or directly to basically anyone who is interested in listening. 
This behaviour is known as voice. When members are raising their voice, management has the 
change to investigate the source of member's dissatisfaction and optimally correct the 
inefficiencies. On the contrary in competitive sectors, if the prevailing choice is exit, then 
membership declines and shortly the organization will be destroyed. However, there are 
dissatisfied members who choose not to exercise voice neither exit. Although those members 
are characterized by high level of loyalty to the cooperative, their behaviour excludes 
management from necessary information to improve the organization. According to Hirschman 
members who actually choose to raise their voice are members that can be described by the two 
following characteristics: they are "willing to trade off the certainty of exit against the 
uncertainties of an improvement in the deteriorated product" or perceive they have the ability 
to influence organization's management (p.77). And while it's already explained how members' 
assessment of control can influence commitment, the first characteristic is directly linked with 
the notion of loyalty. While both exit and voice choices are actions sending to the management 
the same message, dissatisfaction, exit is much easier choice compared to "stay and fight" 
attitude. Empirical results, confirm the relation between loyalty and voice: "Workers at the 
high-loyalty workplaces were more likely to include voice among the ways they would resolve 
workplace problems, while workers at low-loyalty companies were less likely (Hoffmann, 
2006a,p.2327)." In other worlds, loyal worker tent to be more actively involved with the 
organization and raise their voice in order to confront problems they are facing (Hoffmann, 
2006b).  
 
As Hirschman´s classic exit, voice and loyalty thesis (1970) describes, dissatisfied members 
could either exit the organization or express their dissatisfaction; a behavior known as “voice” 
When members are raising their voice, management has the change to investigate the source of 
member's dissatisfaction and optimally correct the inefficiencies. If the exit voice prevails, 
membersip declines and shortly the cooperative will be destroyed. Additionally, the are also 
dissatisfied members who do not exercise their voice either exit. Those members are 
characterized by high level of loyalty to the cooperative, however their behavior excludes 
management from necessary information to improve the organization While both exit and voice 
choices are actions sending to the management the same message, dissatisfaction, exit is much 
easier choice compared to "stay and fight" attitude. Empirical results, confirm the relation 
between loyalty and voice. (Hoffmann, 2006a) 
H8: Members who complain or proposed something are less likely to switch to an IOF. 
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 When dissatisfied members are exercising their voice option to complain or just report 
problems, the optimal scenario is the management of the cooperative to counteract by 
improving services and eliminating problems members are facing. Members could either expect 
management to “correct what is wrong” or their voice to “be lost” due to cooperative’s large 
size, complexity, poor organization or any other fault and inefficiency. However regardless of 
members´ expectations, it is rational to assume when members assess that various changes 
happened after rising their voice, their satisfaction with the management of the cooperative and 
overall satisfaction increases. Therefore the last hypothesis is: 
 
H9: Members who assess their complains or proposals led to a change are less likely to switch 
to an IOF. 
4. Data 
 
4.1. Data and Sample 
The data were collected via Gallup Finland using email survey among a representative sample 
of Finnish farmers both members and non-members of cooperatives. Gallup Finland conducts 
on a monthly base general questionnaires addressing to farmers. The data used for this thesis 
are a subset of a complete questionnaire. The collection of the data took place during Augsust 
of 2010.  
 
The questionnaire received a total of 1295 answers, which corresponds to a response rate of 
47.3%. However not all questions were fully completed. The main fields of production of the 
farmers are presented in the below table:  
 
                                        Table 2: Production fields 
Production Activities  Percentage % 
Dairy cows 28.3 
Other cows 11.6 
Pigs 7.9 
Other farm animals 2.3 
Grain 31.5 
Other plant production 8.5 
Other production 4 
 
 
 
The average field area is 48,7 hectares and 690 hec is the maximum. It is worth mentioning the 
average of all Finnish farmers’ area is 49 hectares. The average number of cows in the sample 
is 26(both for dairy and other use) and the average cows number of Finnish farming population 
is 27. These figures indicate that the data are a representative sample of the Finnish agriculture 
industry. 
  
The average age of the farmers is the sample is 57.2 years with 20 years being the minimum 
observation and 91 the maximum. The male responders represent the 84% of the sample.  
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 A common practice for the average Finnish farmer is to be member in more than one 
cooperative. In our sample 29% of the responders belong to a dairy cooperative, which in most 
of the cases is Valio's ownerships cooperatives. 58% belong to Metsäliitto forest cooperative 
and 28% belong either to Lahakunta or LSO meat cooperative 
 
4.2. Variables and Measures 
In previous section proceeded an analytical discussion over factors that influence members' 
loyalty to the organization. Particularly, 9 hypotheses are stating the following:  
 
Members who: view the cooperative as pure business, are willing to switch if the get the same 
advantages from private buyer, use the cooperative to power or advance their own interests tend 
to switch to an Investor Owned Firm. 
 
On the contrary, members who: 
embrace cooperative's ideology, trust the information they receive , view cooperative as a 
shelter, value previous experiences with cooperatives, complain or proposed something, assess 
their proposal or complain led to a change tent not to switch to an Investor Owned Firm. 
 
 
The number of switches between a cooperative and an IOF is used as a proxy to measure 
loyalty. This dependent variable takes values from zero, if a member never switched, up to 7 
times. The questionnaire includes the 9 statements below, which respondents had to answer on 
a 5-point Likert scale: Value(1)corresponds to fully disagree and (5) to fully agree.   
 
• Cooperative ideology keeps me as member in my cooperative. 
• Experience about long-term cooperation keep me as member in this cooperative. 
• A possibility for using power/advance my own interests through the cooperative keep 
me as member in this cooperative. 
• Membership is a shelter against large producers. 
• The membership in the cooperative is a pure business relation to me. 
• If I get the same advantages through delivering my products to another buyer, I do not 
have any problem for switching the buyer. 
• As how reliable do you regard the information that you obtain from your cooperative?  
 
The member were also asked to answer two numerical questions:  
 
• During the last 3 years, how many times you have complained or proposed something to 
the cooperative/company you deliver your products. 
• How many times your complaint/proposal had led into a change 
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Table 3: Definition of the Variables 
Variable Statement/ Description Measurement 
ideology Cooperative ideology keeps me as 
member in my cooperative 
5-point Likert Scale: 
(1) fully disagree – (5) fully agree 
experiences Experience about long-term cooperation 
keep me as member in this cooperative 
 
5-point Likert Scale: 
(1) fully disagree – (5) fully agree 
power A possibility for using power/advance 
my own interests through the 
cooperative keep me as member in this 
cooperative 
 
5-point Likert Scale: 
(1) fully disagree – (5) fully agree 
shelter Membership is a shelter against large 
producers 
 
5-point Likert Scale: 
(1) fully disagree – (5) fully agree 
pure business The membership in the cooperative is a 
pure business relation to me 
 
5-point Likert Scale: 
(1) fully disagree – (5) fully agree 
readiness If I get the same advantages through 
delivering my products to another 
buyer, I do not have any problem for 
switching the buyer 
 
5-point Likert Scale: 
(1) fully disagree – (5) fully agree 
information As how reliable do you regard the 
information that you obtain from your 
cooperative 
 
5-point Likert Scale: 
(1) fully disagree – (5) fully agree 
complain/  
propose 
During the last 3 years, how many times 
you have complained or proposed 
something to the cooperative/company 
you deliver your products 
 
numeric (times) 
 
impact How many times your 
complaint/proposal had led into a 
change 
 
numeric (times) 
age Age of the responder 
 
years 
sige Size of farms of the responder 
 
hectares 
 
5. Methodology 
 
To examine the hypotheses stated in the previous section, a robust zero inflated Poisson 
regression (ZIP) is estimated. The dependent variable is the number of times the responders 
have switched between Cooperatives and IOF's the last 5 year. The number of switches is used 
as a proxy to measure loyalty and particularly the relation between royalty and the independent 
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 variables. ZIP regression is used to model count data containing an excess amount of zero 
counts. As Figure 1 displays, 77% of the observations in the sample are zero (without 
considering missing values).The number of observations where switching occurs more than 3 
times is too small to be treated  as distinct categories (1.1%) therefore those are aggregated to 
one. 
 
 
Figure 1: distribution of switches 
 
 
As theory suggest, in cases with excess amount of zero observations, those zeros are generated 
by a discrete process from the count values, hence can be modeled independently. The ZIP 
model consists of two parts; a Poisson count model and a logit model to predict excess zeros 
(UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group,) 
 
As Giles, (2010) describes based on the work of Lambert, (1992) the data derive from two 
different regimes, specifically in first regime RI the outcome is always zero and the probability 
of on observation to belong in RI is ωi. At the second RII the counts follow a Poisson 
distribution with probability for an observation to belong in RII  is equal to 1- ωi 
 
Therefore, the dependent variable, the number of Switchesi, takes values: 
 
 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖 =  �0, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝜔𝑖 + (1 − 𝜔𝑖)𝑒𝑥𝑝−𝜆𝑖      
𝑟, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑦 (1 − 𝜔𝑖)𝑒𝑥𝑝−𝜆𝑖 𝜆𝑖𝑟𝑟!  (1)  
 
 
The conditional mean of the Poisson regression λ, and the parameter ωi, follow: 
 
 log(𝜆𝑖) = 𝑋 𝛽 (2)  
 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜔𝑖) =  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜔𝑖 (1 − 𝜔𝑖)⁄ = 𝑍 𝛾 (3)  
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where β and γ are vectors of coefficients and X and Z are vectors of the covariates. The log-
likelihood fορ ZIP regression is given by the following function:   
 
 
where Xi and Zi are the ith rows of X and Z respectively. The final estimation specification 
function is given below:  
 
𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖 = �𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 +  𝛿2𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛿3𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖+ 𝛿4𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿5𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 +  𝛿6𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖+ 𝛿7𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝛿8𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛\𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿9𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖+ 𝛿10𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿11𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝑢1)� /((1+ exp(𝜁0 + 𝜁1𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 +  𝜁2𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝜁3𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖+ 𝜁4𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝜁5𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 +  𝜁6𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖+ 𝛿7𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛿8𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛\𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿9𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖+ 𝛿10𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿11𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝑢2)) (5) 
 
 
To test the fitness of the zero inflated Poisson over the regular Poisson model, hence test if 
there is indeed a mechanism dividing members into two regimes, is used a test statistic initially 
developed by Vuong (1989) for non-nested models. The statistical package used for the 
calculations is StataIC 11(64-bit).In order to obtain robust standard errors of the estimated 
parameters, the vce(robust) option was used aiming to control for small violation of the 
underlying assumptions (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐿(𝛾,𝛽; 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖) = � 𝑙𝑜𝑔�𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑍𝑖 𝛾 + exp (−𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑋𝑖 𝛽)�
𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑖=0
  
+ � �𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖 𝑋𝑖 𝛽 −  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑋𝑖𝛽�
𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑖>0
  
−�𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 +  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑍𝑖𝛾) 𝑛
𝑖=1
  
− � 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖!)
𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑖>0
 (4) 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Observations Mean St. Deviation Min Max 
ideology 594 3.084 1,245 1 5 
experiences 590 3.576 1.168 1 5 
Power 587 3.0766 1.1563 1 5 
Shelter 581 3.327 1.1214 1 5 
pure business 581 3.343 1.120 1 5 
readiness 591 3.455 1.120 1 5 
information 579 3.368 0.94 1 5 
complain/propose 564 1.145 1.918 0 9 
Impact 485 0.570 1.312 0 9 
age 601 58.056 10.059 20 91 
size 571 50.889 48.110 0 690 
 
 
Table 5: Distribution of answers on the 5-point Likert scale statements 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 - 
ideology 89 84 195 140 86 26 
experiences 50 48 136 224 132 30 
power 67 98 217 133 72 33 
shelter 64 69 164 181 103 39 
pure business 34 74 197 159 117 39 
readiness 60 80 148 137 166 29 
information 15 49 140 272 103 41 
 
6. Findings 
 
Table 6 provides the results estimated by the robust zero inflated Poisson model. First the logit 
regression is generated to estimate the "never switching" regime, predicting the pseudo log odds 
of a farmer being a member of the group of farmers who never switched to and IOF. 
In other words, this part of the model explains which variables increase (decrease) the 
probability of a farmer to never switch to an IOF. Then, the Poisson regression estimates the 
different counts for those farmers who are not in the first regime. This regression estimates the 
expected pseudo log counts for the farmers who have switched at least one time. The two 
models are later combined.  
 
The Vuong test suggests that indeed there is a mechanism dividing farmers into those two 
regimes, therefore the ZIP model is preferable to a standard Poison regression (Z=5.50) 
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  Table 6: Results 
Variable (1) Logit 
(2) 
Poisson 
ideology 
 
0.263 
(0.512) 
 
0.153 
(0.129) 
 
experiences 
 
-0.450 
(0.406) 
 
-0.233* 
(0.119) 
 
power 
 
-0.736* 
(0.426) 
 
-0.346** 
(0.170) 
 
shelter 
 
0.353 
(0.268) 
 
-0.070 
(0.113) 
 
pure business 
 
0.637 
(0.393) 
 
0.0242 
(0.106 
 
readiness 
 
-1.139** 
(0.568 
 
-0.196 
(0.139) 
 
information 
 
0.142 
(0.415) 
 
(0.195) 
(1.156 
 
complain/propose 
 
-2.147*** 
(0.627) 
 
-0.210** 
(0.0934) 
 
impact 
 
-0.261 
(0.257) 
 
0.192** 
(0.0852) 
 
age 
 
-0.0223 
(0.0323) 
 
-0.0218** 
(0.00951) 
 
size 
 
-0.00403 
(0.00715) 
 
-0.00359 
(0.0024) 
 
constant 
 
6.234* 
(3.157) 
 
4.115*** 
(0.753) 
 
observations 387 387 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses  
***p<0.01 
**p<0,05 
*p<0.001 
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Logit: the results of the logit regression indicate that the following variables are statistically 
significant:  
• If a farmer increases the answer of statement power by one unit, the odds that that this 
farmers would be in the "never switching" group decrease by a factor of exp(-0.736). 
Therefore, the higher value a farmer gives for the statement regarding power, the less 
likely it is for this farmer to be in the never switching group.  
 
• If a farmer increases the answer of statement readiness by one unit, the odds that that 
this farmers would be in the "never switching" group decrease by a factor of exp(-
1.139). Thus, the higher value a farmer provides for the statement regarding his 
readiness to switch buyer, the less likely it is for this farmer to be in the never switching. 
  
• If a farmer increases the complain/propose variable by one unit, the odds that that this 
farmers would be in the "never switching" group decrease by a factor of exp(-2.147), 
meaning the more a farmer is complaining/proposing to the cooperative, the less likely 
it is for this farmer to be in the never switching group.  
 
Poisson: The results of the Poisson regression show the following variables as statistically 
significant:  
 
• When statement experience is increased by one unit, the expected number of switches in 
the last 3 years decreases by a factor of exp(-0.233), if all the other variables held 
constant. Therefore, the higher a farmer assesses his past experiences form cooperative, 
the fewer switches between cooperatives and IOFs occur. 
 
• When statement power is increased by one unit, the expected number of switches in the 
last 3 years decreases by a factor of exp(-0.346), given that all the other variables are 
constant. Thus, the higher a farmer values the probability to use power/advance his own 
interests, less switches between cooperatives and IOFs are taking place.  
 
• When a farmer increases the number of complains/proposals by one unit, the expected 
number of switches in the last 3 years decreases by a factor of exp(-0.210), assuming the 
rest of the variables are constant. As follows, the more a farmers is 
complaining/proposing to his cooperative, the fewer the number of switches is.  
 
• When the number of complains/proposals led to a change, impact, increases by one unit, 
the expected number of switches in the last 3 years increases by a factor of 
exp(0.192),keeping the other variables constant. Consequently, the more a farmer is 
complaining/proposing to his cooperative, the smaller the number of switches is.  
 
• Finally for each unit increase in the age of the farmer, the expected number of switches 
the last 3 year decreases decreases by a factor of exp(-0.0218)meaning older farmers are 
switching less.  
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 7. Results 
 
Hypothesis 1: Members who embrace cooperative's ideology are less likely to switch. 
  
This hypothesis is not supported by the findings therefore is rejected. It appears that ideology 
has no important impact when it comes to the decision to remain in the cooperative or not. A 
more thorough look in the data indicates lack of consistency in the answers between the 
importance of ideology and the number of switches; some farmers stated that ideology is an 
important factor and yet they switched, others stated it is not an important factor yet they 
stayed.  
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Members who value previous experiences with the cooperative are less likely to 
switch. 
 
This hypothesis is not rejected within 10% level of significance. The variable past experiences, 
found not to have any explanatory power in the Logit part of the model; the part that determines 
the probability of a farmer being in the never-switching group. Nevertheless, it is significant in 
the Poisson regression; farmers who value past experiences from operating with the cooperative 
are switching less. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Members who use the cooperative to power/advance their own interests are 
more likely to switch.  
 
This hypothesis is rejected although found to be statistically significant both in the Logit and 
the Poisson part of the model. The results generated by the model display a peculiar 
contradiction. First, the negative sign of this coefficient in the Logit regression indicates that 
farmers, who will use cooperative to power/advance their own interests, are less likely to be 
included in the never-switching group. In other words, the probability that theses farmers will 
switch at least once increases. Secondly, the negative sign in the Poisson regression indicates, 
that those farmers who have switched and who use the cooperative to power/advance their own 
interest, are less likely to switch often to an IOF. A possible explanation derives from the 
motivating forces of a farmer to patronize a cooperative. The profile of a farmer who is willing 
to manipulate the cooperative organization to advance his own interests yet didn't succeed and 
switched to an IOF fits the results indicated by the model. This farmer probably has no interest 
or limited interest to return to the cooperative, since his initial target was not accomplished. 
This behavior could explain why later the number of switches decreases.  Of course, this 
contradiction in the results could be simply due to data inconsistencies. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Members who view the cooperative as a shelter are more likely not to switch.  
 
This hypothesis is rejected since the findings do not support it. Although the variable 
cooperative as a shelter has no explanatory power over the switching behavior of a farmers, the 
descriptive statistics as shown in tables 4 and 5, reveal  an interesting characteristic of the 
farmers in the sample. Specifically, most farmers tent to view cooperative as a shelter against 
large producers. It might be useful to remind that our sample consists of both smaller and larger 
scale farmers. The fact that the majority of the farmers tend to view cooperative as shelter is an 
indicator of two possible outcomes. First, smaller scale farmers perhaps are not aware of the 
heterogeneity of the membership; a farmer believes that the majority of the members in the 
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 cooperative is small scale producers, therefore view the organization as a shelter for smaller 
producers against larger producers. Alternatively, farmers are aware of the heterogeneity of the 
membership and believe that the cooperative organization acts in a way ensuring that the 
benefits of the smaller scale farmers are not endangered.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Members who view cooperative as pure business are more likely to switch. 
 
This hypothesis is rejected. In both parts of the model, the logit and the Poisson, is not 
statistically significant. Once again, both the econometric model and the descriptive statistics, 
clarify why this variable has no explanatory power when it comes to the decision to stay in a 
cooperative; most members tend to view cooperative as strictly business relationship. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Members who are willing to switch if the get the same advantages from a private 
buyer are more likely to switch. 
 
This hypothesis is accepted within 5% significance level. Specifically, is significant in the logit 
part of the model; these farmers who are ready to switch, are less likely to be included in the 
never switching group of farmers. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the same 
variable is not significant in the Poisson part. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Members who trust the information they receive from the cooperative are less 
likely to switch. 
 
Hypothesis7 is rejected. Trust in the information the cooperative is providing, is not found to be 
statistically significant neither at the logit or Poisson part of the model. However, this does not 
imply that farmers consider unimportant the quality of information they receive from their 
cooperatives. An insight at the descriptive statistics described at tables 4 and 5, shows that 
almost 90% of the sample valued the information statement on the 5-point Likert scale with 
notion 3 or above. With mean is 3.36 and variance 0.94 the variable information does not 
provide sufficient variation in order to be captured by the regression. In other words, the vast 
majority of farmers trust the information they receive from cooperatives which is the reason 
why this statement cannot be used as an explanatory variable when it comes to their switching 
behavior.  
 
Hypothesis 8: Members who complain or proposed something are less likely to switch. 
 
This hypothesis is rejected although it found to be significant in both parts of the model. The 
ZIP model reveals this antithetical relation between the number of complains/proposals and 
switching behavior. Specifically, the more a farmer is proposing/complaining the less likely 
becomes his membership to the "never switching" group of farmers, within a 10% significance 
level. Yet among the "switchers" the same variable tends to decrease the frequency of switches, 
within a 5% significance level. Contradictory as it may seems, the model could indicate a 
sufficiently rational behavior. The initially purpose of this variable was to capture the active 
participation of the members within the organization; the more a member is complaining and 
proposing to the cooperative, the more involved he is. However, the way the statement is 
formulated in the questionnaire could generate misleading results. In particular, the Logit part 
of the model indicates that members who complain are more likely to switch. It comes as no 
surprise that dissatisfied members will switch at least once meaning there are not likely to be 
part of the never switching group. However the fact that among the "switchers" the more they 
complain, the frequency of switches decreases, could capture the relation between active 
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 participation and switching; active members are expected to switch less. All in one, the more a 
member complains/propose to the cooperative the more active becomes therefore loyalty 
increases, however there is a threshold for the never switching group which inverts the relation 
between complain/propose and switching behavior. Another way to explain the results, stems 
from the theoretical approach as discussed in section 4. Hirschman (1970) portrays dissatisfied 
members who do not rise their voice and do not switch. These members pose a threat to the 
organization since they don't give the opportunity to the management of the cooperative to be 
informed about the inefficiencies of the organization as viewed by the members.  
 
Hypothesis 9: Members who assess their complains of proposals led to a change are less likely 
to switch. 
  
This hypothesis is rejected however it is statistical significant. The Poisson regression suggests 
that the number of times the proposal of a member led to a change increases the frequency of 
switches. Is it rational for a farmer to turn to an IOF after noticing his comments had indeed an 
impact on the cooperative organization? A time-lag could explain this behavior; the farmer 
notices the changes after he switched to an IOF. Another possible interpretation is based on the 
individual characteristics of the farmers whose comments laid to a change. Most probably are 
farmers with advanced technical and persuasive skills, articulate and probably higher 
educational background, given that their valid proposals actually were adopted by the 
cooperative. It wouldn't be surprising if a farmer, after realizing his proposals have an impact 
on the organization, decides to exercise the exit option aiming to alter cooperative's portfolio or 
policies. Hakelius et al., (2013) provide an example of a case study where dissatisfied farmers 
with strongly entrepreneur skill and who had earlier exercised “voice, decided to leave their 
cooperative and form a new one.   
 
Control variables: farm size and age. 
 
Finally out of the two control variables, age and farm size, the age of the members found to be 
significant at a 5% level. Specifically the older a farmers is, the expected number of switches 
decreases. In other words, older farmers switch less. As already be mention in previous section, 
there are controversial theories on how farmer's age influence their decision to stay in a 
cooperative. Younger farmers with higher debt compared to older ones, are facing higher 
discount rates therefore are expected to defect more. On the other hand, with respect to farmer's 
individual remaining investment horizon is expected for older farmers to leave the organization 
or free ride. Our findings indicate that discount rate issues are more prominent thus older 
farmers tend to be more loyal.  
8. Discussion 
The overall purpose of this project is to enlighten determining factors of commitment and 
loyalty of farmers in cooperative organizations. The mean to estimate those, is the numbers of 
switches between cooperatives and IOF's. The underlying assumption, the more a member is 
switching the less loyal he/she is, could be subject to criticism regarding its validity. 
Specifically, a member who switched once to an IOF and return to the cooperative regretful 
with full acknowledgement of the cooperative benefits and advantages could be potentially 
more loyal and committed to the organization compared to a member that never switched. 
Therefore someone could argue that the basic assumption does not hold. Nevertheless, the aim 
here is not to capture the current state of member's loyalty. Even if the member in question is 
now more loyal, in the recent past he/she did take the decision to leave the organization. This 
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 project intents to investigate the factors that lead a member to stop patronizing the cooperative. 
All in one, even if initially dissatisfied members after experimenting with other business forms, 
returned to the cooperative organization more loyal and determined to stay, they have been 
disloyal. The objective of the study is to estimate the reasons that contribute to the "exiting" 
behavior.  
 
The choice of econometric model that is used for the purposes of this project was the result of 
an in-depth and extensive research. The existing literature suggests various models with 
numerous implementations for count data: Poisson, Negative Binomial, Zero-Inflated, Hurdle 
Models and threshold models are the most representative model regarding count data analyses 
(Greene, 1994; Hu et al., 2011; Cameron and Trivedi, 2013; Ridout et al., 1998). Because of the 
existent of excess amount of zeros in the data set, Poisson and Negative Binomial models were 
rejected in favor of Zero- Inflated and Hurdle models. The fact that the explanatory variables do 
not suffer from overdispersion, a situation which occurs when the variance is greater than the 
mean, suggest that the Zero- Inflated Negative Binomial model is not the best fitted model for 
the research. The Zero Inflate Poisson and Poisson-Logit Hurdle Regression differ substantially 
in the interpretation and the analysis of the origin of the zeros in the data set. Specifically, while 
the ZIP model assumes both structural (zeros that occur due to the specific structure in the data) 
and sampling zeros (zeros that have been created by chance), the Hurdle model makes the 
assumption of only structural zeros. This assumption cannot be supported by the theory and 
furthermore the Vuong test verifies the existence of sampling zeros. Finally the threshold 
models the assumes “the existence of a continuous latent variable which when and it lies to a 
specific interval then the response Y = y is observed” (Ridout et al., 1998). Both the nature of 
the variables (non-continuous) and the lack of conceptual framework to support the basic 
assumption of the model, lead to its rejection.  
 
There are two aspects to ethics: the first involves the ability to discern right from wrong, good 
from evil and propriety from impropriety. The second involves the commitment to do what is 
right, good and proper” (Maxwell, 2003, p.23). Although it is hard to define what constitutes 
research ethics,  the ethical standards imposed by the researchers along with the aim of the 
research question and the implemented ways are the dominant components of it (Gustafsson et 
al., 2006). With this project, my personal aspiration is firstly to contribute to the research area 
regarding cooperative organizations, secondly to deepen the knowledge and overall 
understanding of farmer’s behavior and finally to replicate previous results with the aim to 
clarify or boost their soundness.  The research methodology was selected after objective and 
careful investigation, aiming to minimize potential bias. The data are reported with honesty; no 
fabrication, falsification or misrepresentation of data is present. Additionally, the findings are 
open for full discussion. 
10. Conclusions and Recommendations 
It is essential for the management of every organization, to be informed about the 
characteristics of the typical member along with the factors that influence the decision to 
remain in the organization. In cooperatives the social capital is the key factor determining the 
successful operation of the organization. With a degree of skepticism, this project contributes to 
the formation of the profile of a farmer-member in a hybrid cooperative organization.  
 
Specifically the Finnish farmer and member in a cooperative: 
• is not indulged in the cooperative ideology. 
• values previous experiences from corporation with the organization 
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 • tends to view cooperative as shelter against large producers 
• trust the information provided by the organization 
• is likely to view cooperative strictly as a business relation to him and will not hesitate to 
change buyer if he gets the same benefits 
 
The above characteristics combined with the fact that the majority of the farmers choose to stay 
loyal in their cooperatives provide evidences of the efficient and successful operation of the 
organizations. A farmer who is not psychological attached to his organization and never 
switched to a different buyer is most probably a satisfied farmer. 
 
Regarding the switching behavior of the farmers the following can be safely concluded: 
• Using cooperative to “advance one's interests” is an indicator of a member who will 
switch form his/her cooperative organization, to another firm – IOF or cooperative – as 
long as he considers that this alternative will serve his interests better. 
• There are members who complain less and decide never to switch to a private buyer. 
• Members who are ready to switch if the get the same benefits, most likely they will 
switch 
• Previous good experiences from the organization have a positive effect and reduce the 
switching activities of a member. 
• A member who is prone to switch, will switch even if the management fulfills his 
requests. 
• Younger farmers are more prone to switch, older farmers are switching less. 
 
Organizational commitment is a term used to describe an individual's psychological attachment 
to an organization. It is positively linked with organization identification (Tompkins and 
Tompkins, 2005). Both terms are used to describe the sense of "oneness" a member feel with an 
organization. Finnish farmers in the sample have been asked about the importance of 
cooperative ideology on their decision to patronize a cooperative and the model reveals an 
inconsistent behavior; contradictory to what the hypothesis predicted the importance of 
ideology that the members are addressing to their decision, does not influence their switching 
behavior. On top of that, they were also asked to assess if the relationship to their cooperative 
organization is strictly a business one. Although this variable found not to be significant, it is 
worth mentioning that almost 82% of the farmers in the sample answered with the notion 3 or 
above, when they were asked if they view cooperative as a pure business relation. It is not an 
exaggeration to argue that these two distinct variables portray the same feature; farmers lack of 
identification with the cooperative organization and the cooperative values. The management of 
the cooperative should pay attention to this finding since literature suggests that members who 
strongly identified themselves with the organizations values and objectives tend to be more 
satisfied and hardworking(Cheney, 1983).  
 
The management of a cooperative is reasonable to continue to provide reliable information. All 
members regardless of their switching activities, value the information services the organization 
offers. They should also try to raise active participation of the members. Members - quite often 
dissatisfied members- do not report the source their discontent. Although they probably will not 
switch to a different buyer, the management does not get valuable feedback from the base of the 
organization. Additionally, it has been argued that organizational commitment increases 
productivity and promotes satisfaction. Considering this, could be also useful for the 
management of the cooperative to encourage activities that will remind members the initial 
values and objectives of the organization. 
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 11. Future research 
 
An interesting question for further research is the relation between loyalty and the performance 
of the cooperatives; at what depth does commitment alter the effectiveness and profitability of 
the organization. Much research also remains to be done with both theoretical and empirical 
approaches regarding the concept of cooperative loyalty and how it is linked with the switching 
behavior of the members. This project estimates factors that influence the decision of members 
to switch buyer however a research that asks directly the farmers what caused their exit 
decision could conclude with more accurate findings. It would be also important to repeat the 
project with a different sample in a substantially different country. The Finnish farmers are 
members of cooperatives with unique characteristics. It is worth exploring how farmers from 
different countries with different cooperative history assess the same parameters. The 
cooperative organization in Finland and generally in Europe is established for almost two 
centuries. It is expected for the members of cooperatives in countries with recent development 
of the cooperative business model, to assess differently cooperatives operations.  
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